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Abstract
In this article, the author examines two considerations that are critical to a full and mean-
ingful assessment of the degree to which Islam, and Islamic law in particular, can find authentic
expressions of themselves under what may reasonably be considered a democratic form of gov-
ernment. The first of these has to do with the scope of Islamic law, or more properly, the scope
of the interpretive authority of Muslim jurists, and whether a State that is governed by Shari‘ah
must necessarily give priority to the views of religious scholars over those of all others in every
aspect of life. Does establishing speed limits, formulating economic policy, or setting standards
for medical licensing all fall under the legal authority of the jurists? If not, is there any basis other
than political fiat upon which the scope of this jurisdiction might be defined? The second consider-
ation is connected to the question of whether in contemplating the relationship between Islam and
democracy, we have not conflated the framework within which modern democracy is packaged,
namely the Nation-State (and some would insist on adding capitalism), with the spirit and essence
of democratic rule. If we could imagine a State structure whose integrity was not equated with
the ability to exercise an absolute monopoly over law-making and the concomitant imposition of
a uniform standard of conduct on all of its citizens, would the idea of Islamic democracy present
as many apparent difficulties as it presently does? The author’s objective is to add a dimension
to the discussion on Islam and democracy that will render future assessments and proposals more
nuanced and circumspect.
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INTRODUCTION'
In his thought-provoking book, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR IsLAMic DEMOCRACY, Professor Noah Feldman
maps out a myriad of possibilities for what he terms an "Islamic
democracy."2 While most observers proceed on the notion that
an Islamic State, and thus the necessary starting point for any
Islamic democracy, is a Nation-State that is governed by Islamic
law, or Shari'ah, Feldman points out that among Muslims, the
centrality of Shari'ah to a State's "Islamicity" ranges from abso-
lute to non-existent. This is important inasmuch as it establishes
the possibility of alternatives to what Feldman terms the "Islamist
State," which is a State that is governed solely on the basis of
Shari'ah. In Feldman's view, Islam is not an insurmountable im-
pediment to the implementation of democracy; it is only Islamist
interpretations of Islam that pose this threat.3 This is because
Shari'ah, the Islamists' sine qua non of legitimate government,
cannot accommodate, according to Feldman, such basic princi-
ples as equality, liberty, and popular rule, not to mention run-
ning a modern economy.4
Feldman does an enviable job of highlighting the many bi-
ases, exaggerations, and misunderstandings that preempt the
possibility of even thinking about Islam and democracy in the
same breath. At least two additional considerations, however,
are critical to a full and meaningful assessment of the degree to
* Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Michigan, De-
partment of Near Eastern Studies. This Article is dedicated to "Two-Pound," Calvin
Butler.
1. My treatment of Islamic law is applicable only to the Sunni tradition. Certain
distinctive features of the Shiite tradition render major aspects of my treatment
inapplicable to Shiite law and jurisprudence.
2. NOAH FELDMAN, AFTERJIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IsLAMIC DEMOC-
RACY (2003).
3. See id. at 6-25, 51-61, passim.
4. See id.
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which Islam, and Islamic law in particular, can find authentic
expressions of themselves under what may reasonably be consid-
ered a democratic form of government. The first of these has to
do with the scope of Islamic law, or more properly, the scope of
the interpretive authority of Muslim jurists, and whether a State
that is governed by Shari'ah must necessarily give priority to the
views of religious scholars over those of all others in every aspect
of life. Does establishing speed limits, formulating economic
policy, or setting standards for medical licensing all fall under
the legal authority of the jurists? If not, is there any basis other
than political fiat upon which the scope of this jurisdiction
might be defined? The second consideration is connected to
the question of whether in contemplating the relationship be-
tween Islam and democracy, we have not conflated the framework
within which modern democracy is packaged, namely the Na-
tion-State (and some would insist on adding capitalism), with the
spirit and essence of democratic rule.5 If we could imagine a State
structure whose integrity was not equated with the ability to exer-
cise an absolute monopoly over law-making and the concomitant
imposition of a uniform standard of conduct on all of its citizens,
would the idea of Islamic democracy present as many apparent
difficulties as it presently does?6 In exploring these questions,
my primary aim is not to impugn the conclusions of Professor
Feldman, though it will become clear that I think his suggestion
that Shari'ah cannot accommodate the essentials of democracy
is premature. My objective is simply to add a dimension to the
5. For a prominent example of this conflation, see FRANcIS FUKUVAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992), where he argues essentially that the end of the
twentieth century has brought about the decisive triumph of capitalism and liberal de-
mocracy as economic and political ideals. This marks the "end of history" for
Fukuyama, in that it represents the end of humanity's ideological evolution in its search
for the optimal economic and political order. See id. While previous systems and ideol-
ogies contained fundamental flaws and inadequacies that rendered them temporary
modi vivendi, Western capitalism and democracy have now emerged as the final form of
human government, humanity's long awaited terminus ad quem. See id.
6. There are several areas where the United States, for example, appears to show
itself willing to serve as a mere referee rather than an actual determiner of rights, and
where it also appears to recognize that different groups and individuals might have
different rights and obligations substantively. For example, the bylaws and rules of pri-
vate clubs and professional organizations are enforced without having come into exis-
tence through the institution of the State, and despite the fact that non-members fall
beyond the reach of such benefits, obligations, or rights.
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discussion on Islam and democracy that will render future assess-
ments and proposals more nuanced and circumspect.
I. UPDATING ISLAMIC LAW, LEGALLY AND NON-LEGALLY
The idea that traditional Islamic law7 is inadequate as a basis
for modern government is grounded, inter alia, in the notion
that this law is anchored to a medieval vision of society that is
woefully out of step with modern realities and sensibilities. This
idea is further exacerbated by Islamic law's purported rigidity
that is said to have resulted from the "closing of the gates of
independent interpretation," which allegedly took place in the
third/ninth, fifth/eleventh, or according to some, seventh/thir-
teenth century. This cessation of independent interpretation, or
ijtihad as it is called, and the concomitant institutionalization of
taqlid, or blind following, as it is most commonly referred to, has
led modern observers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to the con-
clusion that Shari'ah is doggedly impervious to change. As one
noted scholar put it: "[i]n practical terms ...any legal work
composed between 800CE and 1800CE may be cited as evidence
of classical doctrine."8 This perception, along with the failure of
modern Muslim jurists to respond effectively to any number of
issues - from taxation and trading in futures to the admissibility
of circumstantial evidence - has given rise to the ubiquitous
call for a reopening of the gates of ijtihad. The assumption here
is that, through fresh and innovative interpretation, the disso-
nance between Shari'ah and modern reality could be easily, or
perhaps not so easily, overcome. Moreover, many insist, such re-
form would be most effectively realized through a democratiza-
tion of the enterprise of legal interpretation itself, according to
which the classically trained jurists would relinquish their mo-
nopoly over the authority to interpret Islamic law.9
7. Substantively, Islamic law is divided into two main branches: 1) 'ibadat, i.e., "re-
ligious observances," such as fasting, pilgrimage, prayer and the like; and 2) mu'amalat,
i.e., civil transactions, criminal sanctions and the like. My comments about Islamic law
in this Article are restricted exclusively to the second branch, i.e., the mu'amalat.
8. vael Hallaq, Usul al-Fiqh: Beyond Tradition, 3J. ISL.MIC STUD. 172, 176 (1992)
(citing PATRICIA CRONE, ROMAN, PROVINCIAL AND ISLAMIC LAW: THE ORIGINS OF THE Is-
LAMIC PATRONATE (1987)).
9. On this point, see M.A. Muqtedar Khan, The Priority of Politics: A Response to
"Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, " BOSTON REV., Apr./May 2003, available at http://
bostonreview.net/BR28.2/khan.html (responding to Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the
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As I have argued elsewhere,' 0 such a perception is deeply
indebted to the tendency to approach Islamic law from the per-
spective of anthropology, philosophy, or science as opposed to
that of law." The centrality of precedent, the stature of dead
jurists, the privileging of provenance over substance, and the fact
that jurists sometimes settle on bad law have all been assessed as
defects that underscore the inherent inferiority of the Islamic
religion, the imperviousness of Muslim jurists to such principles
as efficiency or justice, or the plain old cognitive limitations of
the Semitic mind. Ignored in all of this has been the fact that,
from the perspective of participants within a legal tradition, "[i] t
is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law,"' 2 and, "[w] hen
an issue arises, whether in theory or in practice ... lawyers habit-
ually seek [not philosophical or scientific or even social norms
but rather] authority."'" In other words, inasmuch as authority
rather than substance is the force that backs law, all legal tradi-
tions tend to be backward-looking and to privilege provenance
over content. 4 From this perspective, the backward-looking ten-
dencies in Islamic law are not an exception but the norm.
Related to the law's backward-looking tendencies is the phe-
nomenon of legal traditions disguising change and evolution.
Challenge of Democracy: Can individual rights and popular sovereignty take root in faith?, Bos-
TON REV., Apr./May 2003, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR28.2/abou.html).
10. See, e.g., SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI (Ruud Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., 1996)
[hereinafter ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE]; Sherman Jackson, Taqlid, Legal Scaffolding
and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory: Mutlaq and 'Amm in the Jurispru-
dence of Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi, 3 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'v 165 (1996); Sherman Jackson,
Kramer Versus Kramer in a Tenth/Sixteenth Century Egyptian Court: Post-Formative Jurispru-
dence Between Exigency and Law, 8 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'v 27 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer versus
Kramer].
11. One of the limitations built into the study of Islamic law in the West is that the
majority of scholars of Islamic law are products of Area Studies programs and have little
to no training in law as a discipline. Their training prompts them to explain Islamic law
as a Middle Eastern phenomenon as opposed to a legal one, while their status as mem-
bers of the ascending civilization (in which philosophy and science dominate, neither
of which values precedent or authority) prompts them to see their subject in anthropo-
logical or philosophical terms. This invariably privileges innovation and change (usu-
ally construed as progress) over stasis and stability.
12. GeraldJ. Postema, Some Roots of Our iVotion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 11
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (citing THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHI-
LOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW (J. Cropsey ed., University of Chicago
Press 1971) (1681)).
13. ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 117 (1985).
14. ALAN WATSON, THE NATURE OF LAW 95 (1977).
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This preserves the immutability of the foundation documents,
such as constitutions or scripture, and adds to the image of the
founding figures as having proffered correct interpretations of
these, which distinction transforms them into repositories of au-
thority whose doctrines can definitively terminate disputes. Over
time, the advantages of sustaining genetic links to these authori-
ties give rise to the phenomenon of later jurists feigning consis-
tency with their predecessors' doctrines, while consciously intro-
ducing changes of their own. In the most highly developed sys-
tems, this ability to effect change in the name of stability is often
taken to signify the very definition of legal acumen. The legal
historian Alan Watson has referred to this process as "legal scaf-
folding," according to which, rather than abandoning existing
rules in favor of new interpretations of the sources, necessary
adjustments are sought through the creation of new classifica-
tions, distinctions, divisions, exceptions, and the manipulation of
the scope of standing rules. 5 In this capacity, taqlid, as I have
noted elsewhere, 6 often turns out to be a far more complex,
demanding, and sophisticated enterprise than ijtihad.
In the Western tradition, movements such as American Le-
gal Realism and Critical Legal Studies have made careers of ex-
posing the tendency of legal traditions to disguise change and
conceal the real as opposed to the putative sources of legal doc-
trine. While no such movements have yet to appear in Islam,
such an effort would prove equally revealing.' 7 For, far more
than any absence of change, it has been the pre-modern Muslim
jurists' acumen at disguising the latter that has sustained the im-
age of Islamic law as a rigid, unchanging edifice. In this context,
modern Muslim (and non-Muslim) observers often reveal them-
selves to be "victims" of the legal mastery of their medieval pred-
ecessors.
18
Once Islamic law is viewed from the perspective of law and
legal science, the appearance of stasis and the privileging of
provenance over substance take on a different meaning. Unal-
loyed, ijtihad turns out to be far less effective as an instrument of
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 93.
17. I hope to be able to complete a work in the near future tentatively entitled,
Towards an Islamic Legal Realism.
18. For good examples of such disguised change in Islamic law, see Kramer Versus
Kramer, supra note 10; see also IsLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 96-102.
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change. For without the advantage of a genetic link to pre-ex-
isting authorities, the results of ijtihad often lack the authority to
command assent, just as the process of ijtihad itself lacks the
power of self-authentication. This is why feminist, modernist, re-
formist, and even fundamentalist forms of independent inter-
pretation tend to exert such little influence on the actual sub-
stance of Islamic law. Such efforts may exert an enormous im-
pact in social, political, cultural, and other contexts, but little of
this is reflected in the manuals of Islamic law."
The upshot of all of this is that if Islamic law is to change to
accommodate the desiderata of modern democracy, such change
will almost have to be effected through legal as opposed to non-
legal (not to be confused with illegal) means. Non-jurists may
exert an indirect influence through their contributions to a pub-
lic discourse that informs the sensibilities of the jurists. Muslim
jurists, however, will undoubtedly exert the most direct influ-
ence. This means that, for better or worse, Muslim jurists will
remain an inextricable element in the actual substance, forma-
tion, and legitimization of any Islamic democracy, both before
and after the concept itself has been vindicated. This is why it is
important to gain a firmer grasp of issues such as the law-fact
dichotomy and the scope of the jurists' interpretive authority -
issues that exercised many classical jurists but seem to have
largely disappeared from modern discussions.
II. THE LAW-FACT DICHOTOMY AND THE SCOPE OF THE
JURISTS' INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
If the jurists are to play an integral role in any modern Is-
lamic State, democratic or other, what are the boundaries within
which their views carry legal authority and outside of which they
carry no authority at all? Similarly, if, as is commonly stated, Is-
lamic law is unlimited in scope and recognizes no distinction be-
tween the sacred and the profane, does this mean that the juris-
19. One need only imagine the impact of feminist, fundamentalist, or reformist
views being taken up and advocated by jurists (as has often proved to be the case).
Recently, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa, or legal opinion, in which he af-
firmed that it was permissible for women to work in the movie indusuy as actresses, as
long as they observed certain principles of Islamic law. See al-Mujtama' No. 1319, at 44,
48; see also al-Mujtama' No. 1322, at 4244. Whatever this opinion may have lacked in
terms of whether it went far enough, no amount of advocacy from women's and other
groups could have earned this position comparable recognition in Islamic law.
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diction of those who interpret this law is equally unlimited? Or
are there areas where the views of non-jurists would take prece-
dence over those of the jurists?
As far back as the fourth/tenth century, Muslim jurispru-
dential writings reflect a burgeoning debate over what would ef-
fectively amount to a distinction between jurisdiction of law and
jurisdiction of fact. The growing trend was to recognize that the
jurist's authority accrued to him or her by virtue of his or her
mastery of the sources of the law and the interpretive methodol-
ogies deemed sufficient to guarantee the plausible if not correct
conclusions.2 0 On this understanding, jurists were recognized as
enjoying only jurisdiction of law. Only those opinions that were
a result of their effort to deduce the strictly legal intent and
meaning of scripture were clothed with authority. Jurists were
not recognized, on the other hand, as enjoying any jurisdiction
of fact. As such, their declarations that were not arrived at as a
part of the activity of interpreting the sources were not deemed
authoritative.
The early Malikijurist, Ibn al-Qassar (d. 398/1008) provides
a primitive example of this line of thinking.2' In treating the
question of the propriety of following the views of the early au-
thorities, Ibn al-Qassar states that it is not permissible to follow
the jurists in their declarations regarding such things as the
sun's actual decline from its meridian as a legal cause, or sabab,
obligating the performance of the noon prayer. One may, and
according to Ibn al-Qassar should, follow the jurists when they
report that the sun's decline constitutes a legal cause. But one
should not follow them when they say that the sun has actually
declined. The distinction here is between law and fact.
A jurist determines the sun's decline to be a legal cause
based on his interpretation of the sources of the law, i.e., the
Qur'an and the Sunnah, or normative practice of the Prophet
Muhammad. He determines the sun to have actually declined,
20. While it has long been recognized that women were an integral part of the
Islamic legal tradition (as teachers, transmitters, etc.), the subject of female jurists in
pre-modern Islam has to date been inadequately treated and still awaits serious study.
For a few examples of female involvement, see Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One
Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought, 29 INT'LJ. MIDDLE
EAST STUD. 185 (1997).
21. See Ibn al-Qassar, Al-Muqaddimafi usul al-fiqh [Introduction to Legal Theory] (Bei-
rut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1996).
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however, on the basis of his own physical observation. Because
his mastery of scripture and interpretive methodology cannot
guarantee the integrity of his sentient observations, the latter are
not to be clothed with any authority. Rather, outside the area of
scriptural interpretation, the views of those with specific exper-
tise or experience, from medical doctors to seamen, take priority
over those of the jurists. 2 2
Ibn al-Qassar's early articulations are informative but brief
and somewhat crude. Discussions of the law-fact dichotomy
reach a high point, however, in the writings of a later jurist,
Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285). In several of his works, al-
Qarafi takes up the problem of what he refers to as "improper
taqlid." Unlike modern observers, al-Qarafi does not see a prob-
lem in taqlid itself, which in his understanding is more a species
of stare decisis than an exercise in blind following. For him, the
problem is, rather, that the jurists, and particularly the ancient
authorities, are often followed in a fashion that reflects a basic
failure to distinguish law from fact and to restrict the authority
of the jurists to their pronouncements of law.
According to al-Qarafi, the function of a jurist is analogous
to that of a translator who interprets the meaning of his patron's
speech to those who do not understand the latter's language.
The patron served by the jurist is God. Those translated to are
lay Muslims who do not understand the more intricate aspects of
God's speech. God's speech is of course revelation, understood
here in the broad sense, which would include the practices and
pronouncements of the Prophet Muhammad. Inasmuch as the
function of the jurist qua jurist is to explicate the legal material
in scripture, as opposed to the historical, theological or other,
his jurisdiction is limited strictly to questions of law. In other
words, his function is to determine such things as the degree of
obligation implied in scriptural commands and prohibitions or
whether a human action carries a particular ruling, or whether a
natural occurrence or human action qualifies as a form of admis-
sible evidence, impediment, legal cause, or prerequisite. This is
in contrast to determining the actual occurrence of human and
natural acts, even those that may carry direct legal implications.
In al-Qarafi's words: "The jurisconsult does not give information
about the occurrence of a legal cause, which activates a legal rule;
22. Id.
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he gives information only on the status of a legal rule as a legal
rule.
23
This distinction between law and fact, or between the status
of entities and their actual occurrence, has far reaching implica-
tions both for the proper modality of taqlid and the scope of the
jurists' interpretive authority. This distinction becomes obvious
when we consider that much of what is recorded in the manuals
of law and handed down on the authority of the masters, con-
tains a mixture of strictly legal interpretations and assessments of
facts to which these were intended to be applied. Al-Qarafi's
point is that contemporary jurists must always be careful to sepa-
rate these two aspects of legal doctrine and to strive constantly to
deny extra-legal doctrines the authority of law. For, when this is
not observed, the result is invariably a violation of the proper
boundaries of taqlid and an inadmissible clothing of non-legal
doctrine with the authority of law.
An example of how all of this applies in a modern context is
the following. In Bulghat al-salik, a twelfth/eighteenth century
Maliki manual still used at the al-Azhar seminary in Egypt today,
under the provisions of implied warranties [khiyar al-naqisah],
the maximum warranty-period on real estate is given as thirty-six
days.2 4 This thirty-six day allowance was not dictated by scrip-
ture, but rather was the result of Malik's assessment of how long
a buyer should be given to inspect a property. In other words,
this was not a strictly legal assertion, but what might be consid-
ered a para-legal one. As a para-legal assertion, it might be ac-
cepted and even acted upon. But it should not be granted the
status of permanent unassailable law. Rather, regarding the fac-
tual question of how much time would be required to afford a
buyer a reasonable opportunity to confirm the integrity of a
property, the assessments of other experts whose specific knowl-
edge was superior to Malik's could be brought forth to displace
those of the latter.
As al-Qarafi had pointed out earlier, however, failure to dis-
tinguish law from fact was an endemic problem. In his words: "It
23. 1 AL-FURU, A.NWAR AL-BURUQ Fl ANWA' AL-FURUQ 11 (Beirut: 'Alam al-Kitab
n.d.) [hereinafter 1 AL-FURUQ] (emphasis added).
24. See Mohammad Fadel, The Social Logic Of Taqlid and the Rise of the Mukhatasar, 3
IsL.Amic L. AND Soc'v 193, 200 (1996) (discussing the distinct classes of Muslim jurists
including the Maliki school).
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is a pitfall into which many a jurist has fallen. '25 True to this
description, thirteenth/nineteenth century Egyptian jurists in-
discriminately clinging to the dictates of medieval law books, led
modern Egyptian authorities to the conclusion that the Islamic
law of implied warranties provided inadequate protection in sev-
eral areas, such as commercial buildings and public utilities. Ul-
timately, this would prompt them, in frustration, to take over
from the French "la garantie dgcennale," or ten-year warranty,
which rendered contractors and constructors liable for a period
of ten years after the completion of a project.26
Again, this was all based on a fundamental failure to distin-
guish between law and fact, and to limit the authority of the law
books to questions of law. Whether an act of sale generates a
warranty is a question of law, resolved on the basis of scripture.
But whether the warranty period should be five, ten, or thirty-six
days is a para-legal question of fact, resolved on the basis of ob-
servation and experience. Moreover, and this is the crux of the
matter, modern experience in this regard would be just as pro-
bative for moderns as the medieval experience had been for me-
dieval observers. As such, based on the conclusions of modern
observers, Islamic law could adopt ten, twenty, or more years as
the warranty period, based on a modern assessment of what
would be fair and reasonable. Furthermore, in setting this dura-
tion, it would be the conclusions of modern contractors, engi-
neers, or insurance adjusters that were probative, not those of
the modern jurist.2 7
Another problem related to the enterprise of separating law
from fact revolves around the issue of custom and its contribu-
25. AHMAD IBN IDRIS QARAF1, AL-IHKAM Fl TAMYIZ AL-FATAWA 'AN AL-AHKAM WA TASAR-
RUFAT AL-QADI WA AL-IMAM 206 (Abu Ghuddah & Abd al-Fattah eds., 1967) [hereinafter
TAMYIZ].
26. See Ian Edge, The Development of Decennial Liability in Egypt, in IsLAMIC LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE 161-75 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990) (discussing the adoption of "la garantie
decennale").
27. ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 133-39 (clarifying that while ju-
rists have nojurisdiction of fact, this does not mean that all of their factual conclusions
are worthless; it only means that these conclusions do not enjoy the status of binding
unassailable law and that they are in no way superior to similar declarations by non-
jurists). Similarly, an executive's actions that are based on factual determinations
could be binding as law, as for example, where the State sets speed limits, but these are
neither permanent nor unassailable, inasmuch as they do not recline upon scripture.
Id.
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tion to the law. The difficulties with custom are highlighted in
the following question put to al-Qarafi:
What is the correct view concerning those rulings found in
the school of al-Shafi'i, Malik and the rest that have been de-
duced on the basis of habits and customs prevailing at the
time these scholars reached these conclusions? When these
customs change and the practice comes to indicate the oppo-
site of what it is used to, are the legal opinions recorded in
the manuals of the jurisconsults rendered thereby defunct, it
becoming incumbent [upon us] to issue opinions based on
the new custom? Or is it to be said, "We are bound by prece-
dent (taqlid). It is thus not our place to innovate new rulings,
as we lack the qualifications to do so. We issue, therefore,
opinions according to what we find in the books handed
down on the authority of the masters."?28
Al-Qarafi's response was that a legal opinion or ruling re-
mained valid only as long as the custom upon which it had been
based remained intact and retained the same implications it had
at the time of the original ruling: "Holding to rulings that have
been deduced on the basis of custom, even after this custom has
changed, is a violation of unanimous consensus (ijma ) 29 and an
open display of ignorance of the religion."30
A1-Qarafi provides a striking example of how the failure to
apprehend properly the impact of custom on the declarations of
the jurists could lead to gross misapplications of the law. In the
famous al-Mudawwanah attributed to Malik, and compiled in the
third/ninth century, if a man uttered to his wife such phrases as,
"You are forbidden to me" ["anti 'alayya haram"], or "You are
devoid [of obligation]" ["anti khaliyah"] or "You are exempt"
["anti bariyah"] or "I have given you to your family" ["wahabtuki 1i
ahliki"], he enacted a triple, irrevocable divorce. On the basis of
this entry, Maliki jurists in al-Qarafi's day, some four centuries
later, declared that any time a man uttered these phrases to his
wife he set in motion the same legal effects. Al-Qarafi protested
that in seventh/thirteenth century Egypt these statements no
longer carried their former meanings and that people now used
them without the slightest idea that they carried any legal effect.
28. TAM-iZ, supra note 25, at 231.
29. According to classical Sunni theory, unanimous consensus, or ijma', was bind-
ing proof, the violation of which could theoretically result in excommunication.
30. TANIYz, supra note 25, at 231.
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It was thus wrong, he insisted, for contemporary jurists to impute
any legal force to these words.
For al-Qarafi, the distinction was, again, between legal and
factual. The idea that God had granted husbands the right to
initiate divorce was a legal question resolved on the basis of
scripture. But, neither God nor the Prophet had prescribed the
actual formulae to be used when resorting to this right. Nor
were the legal effects of the words that came to be used for this
purpose intrinsic to them from the standpoint of language. Le-
gal effect had only accrued to these words through customary
practice, from pre-Islamic times down to the present. As such,
determining whether these words had actually been converted
from plain words into legal formulae was a para-legal question of
fact resolved on the basis of observing local custom, not a legal
question resolved on the basis of interpreting scripture or the
entries in law manuals. As al-Qarafi explained:
A man's statement to his wife, "You are divorced," does not
affect divorce according to the original meaning of these
words. Rather, the original meaning of this expression is that
of informing her that a divorce had occurred. As such, ordi-
narily speaking, these words would not legally bind him in
any way. On the contrary, the effect of such a statement
would be similar to what would occur were she to ask him
about her status after a divorce had already occurred and he
were to respond, 'You are thrice divorced," informing her
that divorce had taken place. This is the original effect of
these words. And they have only come to acquire the ability
to bring divorce into actual existence by the fact that custom
has converted them from a mere assertion into a formula
with legal effect. This is how all such formulae acquire their
[legal] effect.3
Obviously, the decisive issue in all of this was determining if
and when customary usage had actually transformed an ordinary
phrase into a legal formula. This issue represents another di-
mension of the difficulties attending the enterprise of separating
law from fact. In making such a determination, one must not
look to the doctrines of ancient or contemporary jurists, but to
the contemporary practice of the people on the ground. In this
regard, it is neither proper nor sufficient to hold people to the
31. 1 AL-FURUQ, supra note 23, at 23.
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legal effects of a statement simply because it has come to be un-
derstood as such among the jurists. As al-Qarafi pointed out:
It is not enough that a jurist believes that a particular expres-
sion has become customary [as a legally binding formula].
For a jurist's belief regarding what has become customary
may stem from his specialized training, persistent study and
disputation in the law. Rather, for an expression to become
customary is for the common people of a particular locale to
come to understand one thing only whenever they hear it,
not from one of the jurists but from one of their own and
according to their use of the expression for this purpose. It is
this "becoming customary" that is sufficient to transform an
ordinary expression into a legal fonnula by dint of custom.3 2
This extensive quoting of this medieval jurist can only be
justified by the clarity with which it demonstrates that Islamic law
is not synonymous with the contents of classical law books, even
on the assumption that the legal interpretations reflected
therein are substantively correct. At the same time, it clearly
demonstrates the possibility of reconciling the need for stasis
with the need for change in Islamic law. Furthermore, this di-
rect testimony from a classical jurist proves that even under an
optimally operating Muslim polity, Muslim jurists are not the
only authoritative voices to be heard, even on subjects that are
connected to Islamic law. This has far-reaching implications for
the relationship between Islam, Islamic democracy, and Islamic
law.
First, not every opinion recorded in the authoritative manu-
als of classical Islamic law is necessarily binding in a modern con-
text. On the contrary, there is always a need to separate what is
factual from what is legal, and to restrict the authority of the law
books and the jurists to the strictly legal domain. This opens the
possibility, indeed the necessity, for significant change, even in
areas where the legal deductions of the classical jurists are
deemed to be correct. For example, classical doctrines regard-
ing the role of non-Muslims in a Muslim government would inva-
riably be informed by pre-modern jurists' understandings of the
implications of this issue for the security, integrity, and perhaps
even the image of the Muslim State. Given the anti-Muslim sen-
timents emanating from certain Christian and Jewish quarters,
32. TAMYIz, supra note 25, at 234.
[Vol. 27:88
2003] SHARI'AH, DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATION-STATE 101
even today, it is not unreasonable to assume that this was a real-
ity in classical times. As such, there is nothing necessarily wrong
about the discriminatory aspects of the classical law regarding
the role of religious minorities in a Muslim government. (After
all, U.S. law disqualifies persons born outside the United States
from holding certain offices.) Equally valid, however, and this is
the heart of the matter, might be a modern assessment that con-
cludes that there is little to no threat posed by Jews and Chris-
tians serving in government. This would yield a set of rules that,
on the one hand, differed from their classical antecedents,
while, on the other hand, enjoyed an equal claim to authenticity
on the basis of classical interpretive theory.
Second, there are numerous areas in which the views of the
jurists would not be probative and in which those of experts and
even non-specialists could justifiably determine the actual appli-
cation of the law or government policy. The idea that the jurists
would preside over the concrete substance of economic policy,
the granting of medical licenses, or the setting of speed limits is
simply misguided. Jurists may set the outer limits or basic pa-
rameters within which such laws and policies would have to be
formulated. But they themselves would have no direct authority
to set such policies.
Finally, the law/fact dichotomy impinges directly upon the
Islamic version of the doctrine of the separation between church
and State. Unlike Western law, Islamic law was not the creation
of the early "Islamic State," but developed in conscious opposi-
tion to the latter through the efforts of private sub-state actors."
On this development, while the jurists would seek to guard their
interpretive authority from any and all encroachments from the
State, they would also cede to the latter the exclusive authority to
apply the law so interpreted. In this context, the clarity of the
boundary marking the preserve of the jurists also serves to high-
light the proper limits of the State's authority and to mark the
perimeters of its preserve. 4 This has obvious implications for
any construct of an Islamic democracy and must be duly consid-
ered in any discussion of that topic.
33. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO IsLAMIc Lxw 1-5 (1964).
34. See IsLAMic LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 10, at 185-224.
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III. TAMING THE LEVIATHAN: TOWARD A
TRUER PLURALISM
I turn now to the second of the two considerations raised at
the outset, namely that of conflating the framework of modern
democracy with its essence and spirit. Among the issues com-
monly raised in discussions of Islam and democracy is whether
Islam can accommodate what are presented as the twin-values of
equality and pluralism, particularly as these apply to religious mi-
norities. It is rarely, if ever, asked whether these principles are
really reconcilable with each other in the context of a State struc-
ture that insists on exercising an absolute monopoly over law
making and the uniform assignment of rights and obligations
across the board. If the State can vindicate its monopoly over
the law by insisting that its law will be applied equally to all mem-
bers of society, can this be relied upon to obscure or offset the
fact that, while such laws may be consistent with the most deeply
held beliefs of the dominant group, they may be fundamentally
inconsistent with those of others? And in such a context, can the
right to be treated equally with the dominant group, under the
laws and values of the dominant group, conceal the advantages
enjoyed by the dominant group, on the one hand, and the oblit-
eration of laws and values that issue from sources outside its rec-
ognition, on the other?
Stephen L. Carter has recently given a vivid example in this
regard." Carter recalls a conversation with a leading evangelist
who protested that Muslim inmates had no cause to complain
because they enjoyed all the rights and privileges that Christian
inmates have in prison. To this Carter responded, "No doubt
they do. But they would prefer to have the rights they need as
Muslims. The right to do everything that Christians are allowed
to do is not the same as the right to follow God in their own
way.36
My point in all of this is that the perceived inability of Islam
to accommodate equality and pluralism may be far more in-
debted to a particular construction of these principles than it is
to any categorical incompatibility with them. Moreover, this par-
ticular construction of these principles may be far more in-
35. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF
RELIGION IN POLITICS (2000).
36. Id. at 157-58.
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debted to the presumption that an Islamic State, and thus any
Islamic democracy, must pursue an absolute monopoly over law-
making that results in a uniform set of rules equally applied than
it is to any plain meaning of either equality or pluralism. Stated
differently, if an Islamist democracy is to be couched in a frame-
work that presumes, first, a uniform code of law, and second,
that the only legally justiciable rights and obligations are those
that issue from the State, how can this State avoid obliterating, in
the name of equality, numerous rights and obligations that may
not originate with the State, but are deeply held by sizeable seg-
ments of society? More concretely, how can an Islamic State that
recognizes only one repository of law truly respect religious di-
versity without either violating the principle of equality or assum-
ing a certain religious authority that it cannot or should not
claim the right to assume?
For example, suppose that Egypt has become an Islamic de-
mocracy with a majority of Muslims and a minority of Coptic
Christians.37 According to all of the schools of Islamic law, di-
vorce is permissible. But the unanimous consensus in Coptic
Christianity is that divorce is prohibited. Based on the
demographics, this Islamic State would recognize divorce. By ex-
tending this right equally to all citizens, however, it would run
into a problem. If a Coptic woman petitioned for divorce, the
State would grant it, based on the principle of equality. But this
decision would put the State in the position of rivaling the relig-
ious authority of the Coptic Church, inasmuch as it implied that
a Coptic woman could get a divorce, despite the traditional doc-
trine upheld in the Coptic Church. In this instance, the Coptic
Church would have a rightful claim that the State was favoring
the Muslims, since its actions violated the consensus of the
Church but respected that of the Muslims. On the other hand,
if the State refused to grant this divorce, the Coptic woman
might protest that the State had violated the principle of equality
because she was denied a right that others, namely Muslims,
were routinely granted. In both instances, these claims against
the State would obviously undermine the latter's legitimate
37. Scott Kent Brown II, The Coptic Church in Egpt: A Comment on Protecting Relig-
ious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (tracing
the origins of the Coptic Church in Egypt from A.D. 55 to A.D. 61).
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claim that it was democratic.
This challenge to the State's claim to be democratic, how-
ever, either from the Coptic woman or the Coptic Church,
would not revert to the State's claim to be egalitarian or pluralis-
tic. This challenge would emerge, rather, out of the State's insis-
tence that it must exercise an absolute monopoly over the identi-
fication and adjudication of all legal rights and obligations. As
far as equality and pluralism are concerned, these values could
be easily upheld by invoking an "equality of respect" for the di-
verse religions within its borders. This would serve both the
function of treating Christians and Muslims equally and of avoid-
ing the appearance of undermining the authority of the Coptic
Church while respecting that of the Muslims. At the same time,
it would effectively authorize the Muslim and Christian commu-
nities to define certain rights and obligations that were exclusive
to Muslims and Christians, respectively. In other words, by rec-
ognizing sources of rights and obligations other than itself, the
State could countenance some members of society enjoying
rights and being bound by obligations that did not apply to
others. And none of this would violate the principles of equality,
pluralism or democracy.
Of course, even if the State did invoke an equality of respect
that simultaneously recognized the consensus of the Muslim and
Coptic communities, this would not necessarily satisfy the wo-
man in question, since on this recognition she would still not be
able to get a divorce. But, if her disgruntlement reached the
point of becoming intolerable, she could opt out of the Coptic
Church, at which time she would be able to avail herself of the
right to divorce, without pitting the State against the religious
authority of the Coptic Church."9
Ultimately, the problem here is not the State's inability to
commit itself to democratic principles. The problem is that de-
mocracy is being packaged in the presumptions and accoutre-
ments of the modern Nation-State, which can recognize no
other repositories of legal rights and obligations beyond itself.
38. I am indebted to Professor Bernard Freamon of Seton Hall University School
of Law for this example.
39. Of course the issue of opting out of one's religious tradition raises the question
of apostasy, especially when it comes to Muslims who wish to opt out. See M.H. KAMALI,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM 93-8 (1997) (stating a modern view that apostasy in
general terms is not a capital offense under Islamic law).
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On this understanding, the State is destined in any number of
instances either to impose obligations or deny rights that violate
the most deeply held beliefs and values of major groups in soci-
ety. This has far-reaching implications for any discussion of Is-
lamic democracy. For it is ultimately the presumption that an
Islamic State would necessarily seek to impose Islamic law in this
uniform fordizing fashion that raises the greatest fear and oppo-
sition among religious minorities, and promotes the kinds of
doubts expressed by Feldman on the inability of "Islamist Islam"
to accommodate the dictates of democracy.
In point of fact, however, even from the perspective of
Shari'ah, an Islamic State need not proceed on the monopoliz-
ing and fordizing presumptions of the modern Nation-State.
Outside the area of certain public policy concerns, there is no
religious obligation to impose the laws and values of the Muslims
on the entire society. Nor is the Islamic State unable to recog-
nize that other communities derive their sense of rights and obli-
gations from sources other than that of the Muslims. In fact, the
pre-modern Muslim State offers clear precedents for the estab-
lishment of a political arrangement grounded in the principle of
equality of respect that recognizes the right of non-Muslims to
follow the dictates of their own religion.
To take one example, the eighth/fourteenth century
Hanbalite jurist, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, takes up the question of
how the Muslim authorities are to respond to certain practices
deemed morally repugnant from the perspective of Islam but
well-established within the traditions of various other religious
communities in Muslim lands.4" Among these practices was the
Zoroastrian institution of self-marriage. In the Zoroastrian tradi-
tion, Zoroastrian men were encouraged to marry their mothers
and sisters. The question taken up by Ibn Qayyim was whether
the Muslim State should recognize or ban such marriages if they
occurred.
In his response, Ibn Qayyim lays down a basic rule gov-
erning all such practices by non-Muslim minorities. He affirms
that such practices are to be recognized under two conditions:
1) that the religious minorities who engage in them not present
their case to a Muslim court; and 2) that these religious minori-
40. 1-3 AL'ARURI, AHKAM AHL AL-DIIIMMAH [ORDINANCES GOVERNING NON-MUSLIM
MINORITIES] (Y. al-Bakri & A.A. eds., Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm 1997) (1418).
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ties believe these practices to be permissible according to their
own religious tradition. In the case of the Zoroastrian institution
of self-marriage, Ibn Qayyim conceded that this had been a long-
standing tradition in the Zoroastrian community. On this recog-
nition, despite his own moral indignation, he insists that the
Muslim State was not to intervene in any effort to ban such mar-
riages.4
Ibn Qayyim was not, in any sense, a representative of what
might be considered a liberal trend in pre-modern Islam. In
fact, he was the star-pupil of the reputedly puritanical Ibn
Taymiyah, whose views are often erroneously credited with pro-
viding the basis for the modern Wahhabi movement. Despite all
of this, Ibn Qayyim did not deem the accommodation of these
repugnant non-Muslim marriages to be an affront to the integ-
rity or optimal operation of the Muslim State. This was because
the pre-modern Muslim State - unlike the modern Islamic
State which models itself on the modern Nation-State instead of
its own pre-modern predecessor - did not equate the integrity
of the State with either the exercise of an absolute monopoly
over law-making or the ability to impose a uniform code of be-
havior on the entire society. Because of this, the pre-modern
Muslim State bore the potential for the establishment of a true
pluralism, where multiple sources of rights and obligations were
recognized even as the State zealously guarded its status as final
arbiter. In fact, far more than posing a problem for non-Mus-
lims, whose independent source of rights and values provided a
clear basis for difference, it was the heterogeneous Muslim com-
munity, with four schools of law and massive diversity within
each school, that had the greater difficulty sustaining the right
to dissent. Modern discussions of Islam and democracy seem to
have largely ignored this dimension of the issue.42
CONCLUSION
In these times, the relationship between Islam and democ-
racy has come to constitute an issue of global concern. Feldman
41. See 2 AL'ARURI, AHKAM AHL AL-DHIMMAH [ORDINANCES GOVERNING NON-MUSLIM
MINORITIES] 764-69 (Y. al-Bakri & A.A. eds., Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm 1997) (1418) (pro-
viding an entire discussion on Muslim States positions on Zoroastrian marriage).
42. See generally IsLAMIc LAW AND THE STATE, supra note 10 (discussing the issue of
pluralism in Muslim communities).
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makes the important point that, as far as the Muslim world is
concerned, the only democracy of any true value will be a de-
mocracy that can be fully embraced in good conscience by the
broadest spectrum of Muslims. I have argued that in any such
democracy, Islamic law, and thus Muslim jurists, will play an inte-
gral role. I have attempted to show, however, that contrary to
popular belief, neither Islamic law nor Muslim jurists need to be
viewed as enemies of democracy or harbingers of theocratic tyr-
anny. On the other hand, the classical Nation-State need not be
viewed as democracy's inseparable friend, with its monopolizing,
fordizing tendencies, or "secular tyranny." Of course, the sug-
gestion that democracy might be better served by a less central-
ized State will stretch the credulity of many. But even in the
United States, there are those who believe that the only way out
of the looming battle over gay marriages will be for the State to
relinquish to the various religious communities the right to de-
fine or bless marriages, reserving for itself the role of referee in
protecting the civil rights that accrue to unions so defined.4 3 It
may be, then, that the global discourse on democracy is not at all
a one-way street from the West to Islam. And even if Muslims
should decide to embrace democracy, and they may not, it is not
clear that the Western model would be the best one to follow.
Nor is it clear, in light of all that has been said, that Western
democrats themselves have nothing to learn from Islam.
43. Still, beyond such arguments as those based on genetics, one can only wonder,
assuming that gay marriages are allowed, how the United States will deal with Zoroas-
trian petitions for self-marriages.
